Is informational inefficiency priced in stock markets? A comparison between the U.S. and Chinese cases by Yang, Baochen et al.
 1 
 
Is Informational Inefficiency Priced in Stock Markets? A Comparison between 




Using a sample of U.S. and Chinese stocks between July 1999 and June 2016, we investigate 
the pricing role of informational inefficiency in stock markets. We find that the relations 
between returns and the informational inefficiency factor statistically change from 
significantly positive, to insignificant, and further to significantly negative as informational 
efficiency increases. This finding provides new insights into the common belief that emerging 
markets are less efficient than developed markets. We propose new factor models for less 
efficient markets. Our conclusions are robust to altering the ways of sorting portfolios, to 
various subsample analyses, and to alternative factor models. 
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“Market efficiency remains central to the study of financial markets, but while several measures of 
stock price efficiency have been proposed, little is known about how these measures vary over 
time, whether they comove across stocks and with each other, and what economic forces drive time 
variation in systematic market efficiency.”     (Rösch et al., 2017) 
1. Introduction 
Informational efficiency is closely related with the degree to which stock prices 
correctly and quickly reflect information and thus the true value of an underlying 
asset (e.g., Fama, 1970; Bai et al., 2016; Rösch et al., 2017). There is a long-standing 
debate on whether financial markets are informationally efficient between the 
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and behavioral finance (e.g., Fama, 1991; Jacobs, 
2016; Stambaugh and Yuan, 2017). Against the backdrop of this debate, Lo (2004, 
2005) argues that the informational efficiency of a market is time-varying and driven 
by the intrinsic rules of economic selection, known as the adaptive markets hypothesis 
(AMH). Following the AMH, it is increasingly acknowledged that the informational 
efficiency of a market is changing over time (e.g., Neely et al., 2009 and the 
references therein). While informational efficiency is well discussed at the market 
level, there are few attempts to study it at the portfolio level. We bridge this gap by 
investigating whether informational inefficiency, at the stock portfolio level, is priced 
in the U.S. and Chinese stock markets, what the mechanisms are, and the difference 
between these two markets in terms of informational efficiency. 
This study is motivated by the time-varying feature of portfolio efficiency in 
the spirit of the AMH and mixed evidence on whether developed markets are more 
informationally efficient than emerging ones. In searching for evidence on the 
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hypotheses that informational inefficiency is priced in excess returns and that the U.S. 
stock market is more efficient than the Chinese market, we examine informational 
inefficiency in the U.S. and Chinese stock markets between July 1999 and June 2016 
using standard and informational inefficiency augmented factor models. We find that 
the relations between informational inefficiency and excess returns in both markets 
change from positive to negative as informational efficiency improves, which is 
consistent with most of the AMH implicationsi. In view of this mechanism, we argue 
that the U.S. market is more efficient than the Chinese market. Moreover, the 
informational inefficiency augmented models perform better in the less efficient 
Chinese market. Finally, we provide the evidence that these findings are robust to 
alternative ways of sorting portfolios, to various subsample analyses, and to different 
factor models. 
The present study complements and extends existing work in at least four 
directions. First, while the literature on informational efficiency is mostly at the 
market level (e.g., Lo, 2004, 2005), we take it one step further to the portfolio level by 
examining whether informational inefficiency is priced via sorting portfolios. The 
recent literature applies various linear and non-linear tests to one or several market 
indices and documents the existence of informational inefficiency, while empirical 
evidence at the portfolio level is scarce, especially on the relationship between 
informational inefficiency and returns. 
Moreover, we provide fresh evidence supporting the theoretical argument that 
mispricing induces the return premium (e.g., Brennan and Wang, 2010) through an 
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inverse feedback mechanism in the U.S. and Chinese stock markets. Specifically, we 
find that when informational inefficiency is low, the negative relation between returns 
and informational inefficiency stops investors arbitraging for informational 
inefficiency, which makes informational inefficiency expand even further. As 
informational inefficiency reaches a relatively high level, the relation turns positive, 
which drives investors to trade against informational inefficiency to make the market 
more informationally efficient. 
In addition, we contribute to research on multifactor asset pricing models by 
introducing the informational inefficiency factor (IIF), which characterizes the 
evolution of market mispricing. Different from the mispricing factors in Stambaugh 
and Yuan (2017), which are synthesized from existing anomalies, we construct the IIF 
by taking advantage of entropy to characterize collective market imperfections given 
that anomalies change over time (Jones and Pomorski, 2017). 
Finally, our study adds to the existing literature on the comparison of the 
informational efficiency between developed markets and emerging ones, which 
provides new insights into market efficiency. In contrast to the findings of Jacobs 
(2016), we suggest that the U.S. stock market is more informationally efficient than 
the Chinese stock market since it has a stronger inverse feedback mechanism. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the 
debate on market (in)efficiency. Section 3 presents the data and methodologies used 
in this study. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Background literature 
Informational efficiency, which is so-called market efficiency at the market level, has 
been discussed in the literature. Fama (1970, 1991) proposes the EMH, which evolves 
from the random walk theory of asset prices. The role that information plays in price 
formation is termed “market efficiency.” The EMH assumes that security prices at 
any time “fully reflect” all available information under the assumption that investors 
are rational and homogeneous in a frictionless market. Three forms of market 
efficiency are proposed—weak, semi-strong, and strong—based on three information 
sets. The weak-form EMH implies that market prices reflect all information about 
past prices. The information set further includes publicly available information under 
the semi-strong-form EMH and privately held information under the strong-form 
EMH. 
Evidence against the EMH has accumulated. For instance, Simon (1955) 
argues that investors have bounded rationality and make satisfactory instead of 
optimal choices because of costly optimization and limited computational abilities. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that investors tend to be risk averse when faced 
with gains and risk seeking when faced with losses, which casts doubt on the expected 
utility theory dealing with decision making under risk. Following Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), psychologists and economists have found that many types of 
behavioral biases lead investors to make poor decisions (Bailey et al., 2011). The 
types of biases that result in informational inefficiency include overconfidence 
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(Gervais and Odean, 2001; Gervais et al., 2011; Radzevick and Moore, 2011), over-
reaction and under-reaction (Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Chan, 2003; Jiang and Zhu, 
2017), loss aversion (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Bodnaruk and 
Simonov, 2016), herding (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Choi and Sias, 2009), home 
bias (Lin and Viswanathan, 2015), psychological accounting (Grinblatt and Han, 
2005), and regret (Bell, 1983). 
To reconcile the EMH and aforementioned behavioral finance studies, Lo 
(2004, 2005) proposes the AMH from the evolutionary perspective. Lo (2004, 2005) 
argues that natural selection determines the survival of the fittest in a dynamic market 
and that investors learn from their mistakes to adapt to the ever-changing 
environment. Within the AMH framework, informational efficiency is a time-varying 
concept rather than an all-or-nothing one that evolves with dynamic market conditions 
and determines the evolving nature of return predictability. 
Following the seminal works of Lo (2004, 2005), a small but growing strand 
of studies has supported the AMH. Various modified linear and non-linear tests have 
been applied to test the AMH and the statistics of these tests or the measurements 
based on them have been used to measure market efficiency or relative return 
predictability. For instance, Ito and Sugiyama (2009) find that the relative inefficiency 
of the U.S. stock market is time-varying from 1955 to 2006 by taking the time-
varying autocorrelation of stock returns as a proxy of market inefficiency. To detect 
non-linear dependence, Kim et al. (2011) introduce the generalized spectral test, 
which can capture market inefficiency both linearly and non-linearly. They find that 
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the return predictability of the Dow Jones Industrial Average is time-varying and 
driven by changing market conditions. Similar studies include but are not limited to 
Charles et al. (2012), Urquhart and Hudson (2013), Levich and Potì (2015), and 
Urquhart and McGroarty (2016). 
Overall, recent studies have focused on informational efficiency at the market 
level. A single market is taken as a whole, and its index is used as an item in a sample. 
From this macro perspective, markets are not fully informationally efficient and 
market efficiency changes periodically. To the best of our knowledge, no study in the 
existing literature investigates the effect of informational inefficiency on stock 
returns, especially at portfolio levels. This is an important task, given the background 
of the debate between the EMH and AMH, and our study bridges this gap. 
3. Methodology and data 
In this section, we first describe the methods used to measure informational efficiency 
and our empirical approaches and then present the data description and preliminary 
analysis. 
3.1. Measurement of informational efficiency 
One key aspect of our study is measuring informational efficiency. As stated by the 
EMH, stock returns follow a random walk process and are unforecastable in a fully 
informationally efficient market because of investors’ constant arbitrage activities. 
This principle indicates that the extent to which a return series is random is the very 
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essence of informational efficiency. In this spirit, various measurements have been 
proposed by the recent literature, including entropy-based measurements (Alvarez-
Ramirez et al., 2012), variance ratios (Lo and MacKinlay, 1989), return predictability 
(Boehmer and Wu, 2007), pricing error relative to the efficient price (Hasbrouck, 
1993), and the extent to which markets obey the law of one price (Cremers and 
Weinbaum, 2010). Among these measurements, we choose an entropy measurement 
for our research for the following reasons. 
Firstly, entropy measurements have a solid theoretical foundation for 
capturing the randomness of a time series. Generally speaking, approximate entropy 
(AE), which we use herein, is an applicable derivation for short series of Shannon 
entropy, whose continuous version is defined as 
H(𝑃) = − ∫ 𝑃(𝑥) log[𝑃(𝑥)] 𝑑𝑥,
+∞
−∞
                                            (1) 
where H(𝑃) is the Shannon entropy of the density function, 𝑃(𝑥) , of the random 
variable, 𝑥, and ∫ 𝑃(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 1
+∞
−∞
. In information theory, Shannon entropy represents 
the degree of the uncertainty of a complex system composed of 𝑥 outcomes. For a 
time series formed by 𝑥 outcomes, the more random the series is, the higher entropy 𝑥 
has. Therefore, in a fully informationally efficient market, stock return series are 
random, and their entropies reach their highest level. By contrast, in real-world stock 
markets where a degree of market inefficiency can be observed, information fails to 
get incorporated into stock prices accurately and immediately because of market 
imperfections, which produces lower entropy values than the value associated with 
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the perfectly efficient market. In this spirit, entropy provides a method of measuring 
time-varying informational efficiency. 
Second, entropy measurements perform well in picking up the linear and non-
linear features of data series from complex systems. However, measures such as the 
variance ratio based on autocorrelation, cannot fully capture the non-linear 
characteristics of informational efficiency. Instead, AE’s ability to measure 
information on the patterns and variations that a system can display makes it an 
appropriate proxy for informational efficiency. 
Finally, entropy measurements can be applied to both the Chinese and the U.S. 
stock markets. Although measures based on the law of one price can capture non-
linear characteristics, they are constrained by limited data sources in China, which has 
a nascent options market. 
Although entropy is a powerful tool for characterizing the diversity of the 
patterns contained in a time series, its application has been hindered by its strict data 
requirements. After Gulko (1999) first introduced the concept of entropy to financial 
studies, Pincus (1991) proposed AE under the assumption that if the joint probability 
measures that describe two systems differ, their marginal distributions on a fixed 
partition are likely different. Further, Pincus and Kalman (2004) demonstrate the 
applicability of AE by considering empirical data and models in financial markets. 
They argue that as a model-independent measure of sequential irregularity, AE is 
excellent for dealing with financial time series, even if the sequences are short, as well 
as for signaling the level of market stability. Since then, entropy has been used to 
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measure market efficiency in various markets such as stock markets (Alvarez-
Ramirez et al., 2012) and crude oil markets (Martina et al., 2011). 
Our measure of informational efficiency by AE is more direct than the 
approach of Alvarez-Ramirez et al. (2012), who measure informational efficiency 
using AE divided by the minimum AE of 5000 random sequences for each timescale. 
As AE is divided by the same minimum entropy for each time scale, it does not affect 
the rank of stocks. Specifically, we calculate AE using the algorithm in the Appendix. 
3.2. Empirical models 
We check whether various asset pricing models, which include factors such as size, 
book-to-market, momentum, operating profitability, investment, and informational 
inefficiency, can explain the time-series variations in stock returns. We focus on 
examining whether the IIF plays an essential role in explaining time-series variations 
in stock returns. 
We adopt the following factor models to conduct ordinary least squares 
regressions. These are presented in equations (2) to (9), which denote the CAPM, 
FF3F, IIF3F, WML4F, FF5F, IIF4F, IIF5F, and IIF6F, respectively. These models are 
used for main two aims. The first is to evaluate the ability of the IIF to price assets. As 
market and size factors outperform the other factors (see Section 4.1), we construct 
IIF3F to compare the pricing ability of the IIF and factors except for MP and SMB in 
FF3F, WML4F, and FF5F. (See the notes to Table 1 for the definitions of the studied 
factors.) In other words, we aim to compare models (3), (4), (5), and (6). The second 
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aim is to check the robustness of the relationship between the IIF and excess returns. 
We attain our second aim by adding the IIF into the FF3F, WML4F, and FF5F 
models, from which equations (7), (8), and (9) are obtained. The CAPM, given in 
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where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡  is the excess return of the portfolios; 𝑀𝑃𝑡  is the market excess 
return ii; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the size factor; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the book-to-market factor; 𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the 
momentum factor; 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the profitability factor; 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡  is the investment factor; 
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝑡  stands for the orthogonalized IIF; 𝜀𝑝𝑡  denotes the pricing error term; and the 
factor sensitivities or loadings, 𝑏𝑝 , 𝑠𝑝 , ℎ𝑝 , 𝑤𝑝 , 𝑐𝑝 ,  𝑟𝑝 , and 𝜑𝑝 , are the slope 
coefficients for MP, SMB, HML, WML, CMA, RMW, and IIF, respectively. We use 
Newey and West’s (1987) standard error estimator for the asymptotically correct 
standard error estimation under possible heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation of 
unknown form. 
Following Fama and French (2015), we construct 25 portfolios by bivariate or 
univariate sorts at the end of June each year. We form portfolios in three ways, which 
are based on (1) informational inefficiency and size (AE-size), (2) informational 
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inefficiency and the book-to-market ratio (AE-BM), and (3) informational 
inefficiency only (AE). When forming these 25 AE-size portfolios, we assign each 
stock to five informational inefficiency portfolios according to the AE rank. 
Independently, we sort the stocks into five equal-sized portfolios according to the 
market capitalization rank. We then form the 25 portfolios by taking the intersection 
between the AE and size groups; in a similar way, we obtain the 25 portfolios using 
AE and the book-to-market ratio. When forming the 25 informational inefficiency 
portfolios, we assign all stocks to one of the 25 equal-sized portfolios by AE rank. 
After constructing these portfolios, we compute the value-weighted monthly returns 
for each portfolio. We calculate the excess portfolio returns by taking the difference 
between the daily portfolio returns and risk-free rate. We rebalance the portfolios at 
the end of June every year from 1999 to 2016. 
We construct the Fama–French three factors and momentum factor (MP, 
SMB, HML, and WML) following Fama and French (1993, 2012). The IIF is 
constructed as follows. At the end of each June, firms are ranked by size (market 
capitalization) and assigned to either a small-sized portfolio or a large-sized portfolio. 
Then, these stocks are independently ranked and assigned to three portfolios by their 
AE. The high-AE L1 portfolio contains the top 30% of stocks, while the low-AE L3 
portfolio contains the bottom 30% of stocks. The middle 40% of stocks are assigned 
to the L2 portfolio. Then, six portfolios (S/L1, S/L2, S/L3, B/L1, B/L2, and B/L3) are 
formed at the intersections of the independent sorts on size and AE. The value-
weighted daily returns of these six portfolios are calculated each day over the year 
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after portfolio formation. Repeating this procedure for each year produces 4116 value-
weighted daily returns from July 1999 to June 2016 for every portfolio. The IIF is the 
simple average of the difference in returns between the L3 portfolios (with high 
portfolio returns) and L1 portfolios (with low portfolio returns): 
[( / 3 / 1) ( / 3 / 1)] / 2IIF S L S L B L B L= − + −                (10) 
To show how informational inefficiency is priced, we orthogonalize the IIF 
using the FF3F, WML4F, and FF5F models. For instance, we perform the 
orthogonalization using the FF5F model as follows: 
t e e t e t e t e t e etIIF a b MP s SMB h HML r RMW c CMA = + + + + + +        (11)  
The orthogonalized IIF is constructed as the sum of the intercept 𝑎𝑒 and residual 𝜀𝑒𝑡. 
When orthogonalized using WML4F and FF5F, this procedure is repeated with the 
corresponding models. Unless otherwise specified, the IIFs hereafter (except those in 
Section 4.1) are the orthogonalized IIFs. 
3.3. Data description and preliminary analysis 
We obtain the U.S. stock trading data and annual accounting data from the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices and Compustat databases. All data for the Chinese stock 
market are from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database. We 
calculate the daily risk-free rates using the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate and 
People’s Bank of China’s one-year deposit rate, respectively. 
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In line with previous studies (Fama and Macbeth, 1973; Fama and French, 
1992), we adopt the following four data selection criteria. First, we select the daily 
return data of non-financial companies with appropriate adjustments for capital 
changes such as splits and stock dividends. Second, we exclude firms with negative 
book-to-market ratios. Third, we delete stocks that have more than 50 trading days of 
missing returns in rolling windows of 500 consecutive trading days to rule out thin-
trading stocks, which are likely to have different return characteristics to other types 
of stocksiii. Fourth, following Wang and Xu (2004), we exclude initial public offering 
(IPO) returns in the first month of individual stocks from the Chinese sample because 
first-month IPO stock returns are abnormally high in the Chinese A-shares market, 
with most being more than 50%. Hence, excluding IPO returns in the first month of 
individual stocks can help rule out extreme returns, which could severely bias our test 
results. Finally, our sample consists of firms with daily individual stock returns with 
dividend reinvestment, market capitalization, book-to-market ratios, operating 
profitability, growth in total assets, and monthly trading volumes. Our final sample 
includes an average of 816 listed firms per day from the Chinese stock market and 
802 stocks per day from the U.S. stock market from July 1999 to June 2016. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics and pairwise correlation coefficients 
among the explanatory variables in the U.S. and Chinese stock markets. In Panel A, 
two points are worth mentioning. First, the corresponding factors in both countries 
have a different magnitude, which indicates dissimilar market conditions in the two 
economies. For instance, U.S. SMB has a mean of 13 base points, while the Chinese 
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SMB is much smaller. Second, although some factors have a mean of zero, all factors 
have notable deviations from their means. To give an illustration, the IIF has notable 
5% and 95% percentiles like the other factors, which suggests time-varying premiums 
for informational inefficiency in both markets. In line with Brennan and Wang’s 
(2010) argument, we show in Section 4.3 that informational inefficiency can induce a 
premium even with an average of zero. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the Pearson pairwise correlations among our 
variables. Except for the slightly high correlation coefficients between HML and 
CMA in the U.S. market, most of the other coefficients are below 0.30, which 
suggests that multicollinearity is not severe in our study. 
As mentioned before, the performance of the IIF varies over time, as the AMH 
implies. To provide a further illustration, we investigate its dynamic feature in moving 
subsamples of different lengths separately. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1 shows the P-values of one-sample t-tests on the U.S. and Chinese 
IIFs in the moving subsamples with a length of 1000, 300, 100, and 50 days, 
respectively. The horizontal axis denotes the dates when the subsamples begin. The 
vertical axis denotes the P-values, which represent the probability that the IIF has a 
mean of zero in a subsample under the zero-mean hypothesis. The horizontal line with 
a P-value of 0.1 shows the 10% significance level, below which the subsamples have 
significant IIFs. As we can see, when the length of the subsamples is set to 1000 days, 
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the IIF varies over time, but there is no sign of significance in either the U.S. or the 
Chinese stock markets. However, when the subsamples are shortened to 300, 100, and 
50 days, more and more subsamples with significant IIFs appear. This finding implies 
that the process that information related to intrinsic values is absorbed into asset 
prices takes time. Consequently, when processing information, the shorter a rolling 
window is, the more likely a market is to see a significant IIF. Moreover, compared 
with the United States, the Chinese stock market witnesses subsamples with more 
significant IIFs, which suggests it is more informationally inefficient. These results 
are further corroborated by the orthogonalized IIF results in Section 4. 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
Likewise, the performance of the other factors varies as the subsamples 
become shorter, which is consistent with the AMH. Figure 2, similar to Figure 1, 
shows the performance of SMB in the U.S. and Chinese stock markets. Different from 
the IIF, the subsamples with a fixed length of 1000 days see impressive long-short 
returns on size in the U.S. market. Instead, SMB performs unstably as the IIF in the 
50-day subsamples. Moreover, other factors including MP, HML, WML, RMW, and 
CMA behave in a similar way in the short run regardless of their behavior in the long 
run. To save space, the plots of these factors are not shown, but they are available on 
request. The dynamic performance of such factors may result from stock prices failing 
to incorporate information in the short term. We show in Section 4.3 that the process 
of integrating information is achieved through a time-consuming negative feedback 
mechanism rather than immediately. 
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4. Empirical results 
We present the results from various standard tools that permit us to gauge from 
different angles the answer to the central question in our study. Section 4.1 discusses 
the necessity of the IIF. Section 4.2 considers the performance of the eight factor 
models and Section 4.3 examines the role that the IIF plays in asset pricing. Sections 
4.4 and 4.5 present the results on model evaluation and further robustness tests, 
respectively. 
4.1. IIF 
When performing time-series regression, the tests on whether a new factor can be 
added into an existing factor model are identical to those on whether the alpha 
declines with the new factor introduced. When factors are correlated with each other, 
adding a new factor might influence the coefficients of existing factors without 
lowering the alpha. A practical way to overcome this problem is to orthogonalize the 
new factor on the existing factors and form an orthogonalized new factor, which we 
use in this study to test whether it can be added into the existing factor model. 
According to the AMH, the additional pricing ability provided by the IIF 
relative to existing models may vary over time as market conditions change. On the 
one hand, during a certain period, the pricing information in the IIF that results from 
market imperfections could be covered by existing factor models, which indicates that 
the IIF helps little in improving pricing accuracy. In such a case, the newly 
orthogonalized factor is insignificantly different from zero, which indicates that the 
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market has relatively high informational efficiency, as informational inefficiency has 
little extra effect on returns. On the other hand, if the IIF cannot be explained by 
existing factor models, the newly orthogonalized factor is significantly different from 
zero and can be added into the existing factor model. Accordingly, the market is less 
informationally efficient. To avoid sampling bias, we use subsamples of fixed lengths 
varying from 40 to 1500 days. 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
Figure 3 reports the percentages of the subsamples of fixed lengths in which 
the orthogonalized IIF using FF5F is significantly different from zero. The horizontal 
axis shows the lengths of the moving subsamples. To save space, similar results when 
using FF3F and WML4F to the orthogonalized IIF are not shown but are available 
upon request. As the figure shows, the orthogonalized IIFs perform better in shorter 
moving windows, even better than SMB in terms of 40 days in both the U.S. and the 
Chinese stock markets. This finding indicates that the IIF carries extra information 
beyond the existing factor models, especially in the short run when new information 
on returns cannot be fully processed. Therefore, it is necessary to add the IIF into the 
factor models, as without it, the factor models do not perform well in shorter sample 
periods. 
4.2. Factor model performance 
We use the aforementioned eight factor models and report the numbers of significant 
factor coefficients of these factor models in Table 2. Panels A, B, and C report the 
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results for portfolios constructed in different ways. We report the numbers of 
significant coefficients at the 5% level for each model. The results for the 10% 
significance level are available on request. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
The significance of the coefficients of a factor signals whether an asset has 
risk exposure to this factor. As the table shows, several points are worthy of mention. 
First, interestingly, the magnitude of the significant coefficients for MP, SMB, HML, 
and IIF is large, which underlies their economic significance. Moreover, MP and 
SMB are the most significant and robust across all three panels in both markets, 
followed by HML and IIF. This result shows that most of the portfolios have risk 
exposure on the market, size, and BM factors as well as the IIF. Second, the number 
of significant IIF coefficients is higher than that of the WML, CMA, and RMW 
coefficients, which also suggests that the IIF is an important risk factor in asset 
pricing models. Furthermore, compared with the U.S. market, the Chinese market has 
more risk exposure to the IIF, which signals that it might be more informationally 
inefficient. 
One measure of the ability of an asset pricing model is the number of assets it 
can price. Therefore, the number of significant intercepts is an important indicator. 
The fewer significant intercepts there are, the better is the pricing model. On the one 
hand, the U.S. and Chinese markets share two common features in terms of model 
performance. First, the CAPM has the most substantial number of significant 
intercepts at the 5% significance level when dealing with portfolios constructed by 
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different ways of sorting. Second, on the basis of IIF3F, there is little improvement as 
the number of factors increases. On the other hand, in the Chinese stock market, IIF3F 
has the fewest significant intercepts at the 5% significance level in Panels A and B of 
Table 2 and has similar performance to FF5F and IIF6F in Panel C, which means that 
IIF3F can price these portfolios better than the other models. On the contrary, the IIF 
models in the U.S. market improve only a little by introducing the IIF into the 
traditional model. The more important role the Chinese IIF plays in asset pricing 
indicates that the Chinese stock market is less informationally efficient. The common 
belief that the U.S. stock market is more informationally efficient is supported by not 
only the more pricing information the IIF carries in the Chinese market, but also the 
stronger mechanism in the U.S. market, as we show in Section 4.5. 
4.3. Role of the IIF in asset pricing 
Table 3 reports the coefficients of the IIF in the time-series regressions with factor 
models including IIF3F and IIF6F in the U.S. and Chinese stock markets. Panel A 
shows the coefficients of the IIF from the regressions using the different pricing 
models on the portfolios constructed by AE and size. The coefficients of the risk 
factors should be non-negative because investors require more compensation to bear 
more risk. Further, the coefficients of the IIF across the AE-size portfolios for all four 
models show three distinct patterns. The first pattern shows a number of negative 
coefficients that cannot be ignored; the positive coefficients are mainly distributed on 
the left-hand side of the table, whereas the negative coefficients are distributed on the 
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right-hand side. The second pattern is that the most statistically significant 
coefficients are mainly concentrated on the extremes of the AE groups and the 
coefficients in some moderate AE groups are both positive and negative. Moreover, 
the number of portfolios that have significantly positive exposure to the IIF in the 
U.S. stock market from the different models is less than that in the Chinese market 
(six portfolios in the U.S. market and 15 in the Chinese market on average). 
Overall, as AE increases, the coefficients of the IIF statistically change from 
significantly positive, through insignificant, to significantly negative. As expected, 
not all the coefficient rows follow this pattern perfectly because of the limited range 
of informational inefficiency. For instance, in the second largest groups in the U.S. 
stock market, the coefficients change from insignificantly negative to significantly 
negative as AE increases. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the coefficients of the IIF from the regressions with 
the different pricing models on the portfolios constructed by AE and BM. The number 
of negative coefficients changes slightly. In every row, the transition of coefficients 
from significantly positive to significantly negative is similar to that in Panel A. In 
addition, the Chinese market still has more significantly positive coefficients than the 
U.S. market. 
Panel C shows the coefficients of the IIF from the regressions with the 
different pricing models on the portfolios constructed by AE only. Compared with the 
results for the portfolios formed by two variables, Panel C seems to show mixed 
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evidence on the patterns in Panels A and B. For the Chinese market, the patterns are 
rather straightforward. Except for some data surprises, they are similar, with 
significantly positive coefficients in the top part, insignificant ones in the middle part, 
and significantly negative ones in the bottom part. Instead, for the U.S. market, it 
seems far-fetched that the pattern exists. In view of the patterns in the former panels 
and complexity of informational inefficiency resulting from various market 
imperfections, we further study the correlation between AE, size, and BM to dissect 
the unexpected results in Panel C. We find that AE in the Chinese market correlates 
with size and BM with coefficients of 0.30 and 0.48, respectively. By contrast, AE in 
the U.S. market has high correlation coefficients of 0.85 and 0.60, respectively. 
Hence, the results in Panel C are consistent with those in Panels A and B. 
Informational inefficiency may induce a negative premium, as it is closely 
related to behavioral bias, which might be negatively priced. By dividing the 
mispricing premium into four elements, Brennan and Wang (2010) show that the 
premiums related to under-reaction and overpricing are negative. Similarly, Hong and 
Sraer (2016) show that when aggregate investor disagreement is high, expected 
returns can be negatively related to the beta. 
The fact that the coefficients of the IIF statistically change from significantly 
positive to significantly negative as informational inefficiency declines shows that 
trading on informational inefficiency is profitable (unprofitable) when it is high (low). 
This finding concurs with the AMH. Under the AMH framework, the relationship 
between risk and returns is unstable because of changing market conditions (e.g., the 
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policy environment and preferences of market participants). For participants that have 
bounded rationality, the turning point from a positive relationship to a negative one is 
unknown. Investors tend to trade based on their experience before they realize there 
has been a reversal in the IIF–return relationship. Moreover, this may account for the 
malfunctioning of their investment strategies that once functioned well. 
Similar to Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), this study 
considers investors to be driven by profit on informational advantages. When 
informational inefficiency is high, the returns of trading on informational advantages 
cover the cost of doing so, and the more informational advantages investors exploit, 
the more they will earn. In this case, investors keep arbitraging for informational 
inefficiency and thus the market becomes more informationally efficient. Hence, there 
is a positive relationship between returns and risk on informational inefficiency under 
high informational inefficiency. However, when the levels are low, the cost of trading 
on informational advantages is more than its return, and the more informational 
advantages investors exploit, the more they lose. Although investors that have 
bounded rationality do not know the exact turning point of the sign of the IIF–return 
relationship, investors stop (begin) arbitraging as soon as they realize the turnaround, 
which results in higher (lower) levels of informational inefficiency relative to the 
level at the turning point. In this negative–positive circle originating from market 
imperfections and driven by time-varying market conditions, loss and gain alternate 
when trading on informational inefficiency. We call this cycle an inverse feedback 
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mechanism, which raises informational efficiency when it is too low and lowers it 
when it is too high. 
4.4. Factor model evaluation 
As Section 4.2 shows, relative to traditional models, models including the IIF can 
price these portfolios better in the Chinese market, whereas they have average 
performance in the U.S. market. In this section, we further evaluate the performance 
of these models following the literature (Fama and French, 2015). 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
If an asset pricing model covers all the risk factors that determine stock 
returns, the intercept should be zero in regressions of an asset’s excess returns on the 
model’s factor returns. Following Fama and French (2015), we use the average 
absolute value of the intercepts (AAVI) in the regressions and the GRS F-test 
(Gibbons et al., 1989) to assess the performance of the models. The GRS statistic has 
been formulated under the assumption of normal error terms that are homoscedastic 
and uncorrelated over time, and it is subject to a chi-square distribution under the null 
hypothesis that the intercepts from the regressions on a perfect model should be 
jointly indistinguishable from zero. We examine eight of the factor models (CAPM, 
FF3F, IIF3F, WML4F, IIF4F, FF5F, IIF5F, and IIF6F) and evaluate their overall 
explanatory power. Panels A, B, and C in Table 4 show the results for these eight 




A better model would have a lower AAVI or a higher insignificant result (or 
lower GRS-Stat) in the GRS F-test. Overall, the models including the IIF show an 
equal or better performance than traditional models. For instance, in Panel A, AAVIs 
decrease significantly by introducing the IIF (3.83–3.76 from FF3F to IIF4F, 5.76–
5.43 from WML4F to IIF5F in the U.S. market) and IIF3F outperforms the other 
models in terms of model concision and precision. In Panel C, adding the IIF also 
helps improve the pricing ability of traditional models. The U.S. stock market in Panel 
B appears to be an exception, probably because it is more informationally efficient. In 
a highly efficient market, the IIF plays a less vital role in asset pricing, which results 
in it adding more noise relative to the contributions it makes. 
4.5. Additional robustness checks 
Seeking to add additional robustness to our main findings, we conduct subsample 
analyses of the IIF models using a fixed moving window varying from 40 to 1500 
days. In Section 4.3, we found that the inverse feedback mechanism is constituted by 
three parts of the IIF–return relationship, namely being significantly positive, 
insignificant, and significantly negative. We show that parts of or all the mechanisms 
in Section 4.3 disperse in the different subsamples and nothing goes beyond the 
pattern. To save space, we report the case regressed on IIF6F using a fixed moving 
window of 1000 days to illustrate the dynamic feature of the inverse feedback 
mechanism. The results using the other window lengths or from the regressions on the 
other models are not shown but are available upon request. 
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[Insert Figure 4 around here] 
Figure 4 shows the patterns of the coefficients of the IIF from the time-series 
regressions on the portfolios formed by AE and size using IIF6F in the moving 
subsamples of a fixed length of 1000 days. As the legend ticks show, the seven colors 
represent the seven kinds of coefficients (i.e., significantly positive or negative at the 
three significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% and insignificant coefficients at the 10% 
significance level) in the negative feedback mechanism. The blue (red) bars denote 
positive (negative) coefficients. Therefore, the color bar from its blue end to red end 
can be regarded as the complete changing process of the coefficients of the IIF as 
informational efficiency improves. The vertical axis shows the portfolios. For 
example, S1E1 is the portfolio with the smallest size and lowest AE in a subsample. 
The horizontal axis denotes the dates when the subsamples start. 
Figure 4 highlights several of the attractive features of the inverse feedback 
mechanism. First, for all five AE portfolios within the same size portfolios, the 
transitions of the IIF coefficients as informational efficiency increases are subject to 
the negative feedback mechanism in both the U.S. and the Chinese stock markets. In 
the Chinese market, most size groups across all the moving subsamples are dominated 
by the entire mechanism that moves from dark blue, through light yellow, and ends at 
deep red from the E1 groups to the E5 groups. By contrast, a minority of the U.S. size 
groups (e.g., the smallest size groups in the subsamples that start after June 10, 2009) 
hold the complete mechanism. A majority of the U.S. subsamples are overshadowed 
by the light yellow, with the red area the second largest. The more non-positive IIF–
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return relations indicate that the U.S. stock market is more informationally efficient 
than the Chinese market, which supports the widely held belief that emerging markets 
are less efficient than developed markets. 
Second, megacap portfolios tend to be more informationally efficient than 
microcaps. In support of this, the blue area in every size group shrinks from S1 to S5 
in the U.S. and Chinese markets. The slower process of microcaps incorporating 
information into prices may result from their illiquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986; Lin et al., 2018) or behavioral biases (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Carpentier et 
al., 2018). 
Third, the positions of the shifts between the positive and negative IIF–return 
relations vary over time. The light yellow area in every five size groups consists of 
turning points that signal changes in the signs of the IIF–return relations. Over time, 
the insignificant territories broaden or narrow inside the space enclosed by the red and 
blue bars as in the Chinese market or occupy most of the 25 portfolios between June 
25, 2003 and June 10, 2009 as in the U.S. market. This time-varying characteristic of 
the mechanism mirrors the dynamic market conditions in an evolving market, which 
is consistent with the literature (e.g., Lo, 2004, 2005; Urquhart and Hudson, 2013; 
Urquhart and McGroarty, 2014). 
As the mechanism implies, the U.S. and Chinese stock markets are driven by 
the trade-off between profit that induces arbitraging and loss that inhibits such an 
activity. This finding suggests that significantly positive or negative IIF–return 
relations are unstable as investors keep changing their decisions. We argue that in a 
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relatively stable market, the IIF–return relation finally converges to be insignificant as 
investors learn from their trading. Further, the more efficient a market is, the less time 
convergence takes. Indeed, the mechanism’s ability to converge is central to market 
efficiency in an imperfect market, which complements the traditional view that higher 
informational efficiency stands for a more efficient market. In this sense, we suggest 
that the U.S. stock market is more informationally efficient than the Chinese market. 
When we change the length of the subsamples, regression model, or ways of 
sorting portfolios, the new results are consistent with our earlier findings. The 
robustness of our findings thus provides strong support for the AMH and shows how 
informational efficiency in the Chinese stock market evolves. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Inspired by the dynamic view of market efficiency incorporated into the AMH, we 
study how informational inefficiency is priced in portfolio returns and complement 
recent studies at the market level using U.S. and Chinese stock data from July 1999 to 
June 2016. We draw the following four main conclusions. 
First, we find that as informational efficiency increases, the relations between 
returns and the IIF statistically change from significantly positive, through 
insignificant, to significantly negative, which indicates an inverse feedback 
mechanism in the U.S. and Chinese stock marketsiv. This mechanism appears to be a 
result of investors’ trade-off between profit and loss when arbitraging, which makes 
the market “adaptively efficient.” That is, whenever informational inefficiency is too 
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high or low, the invisible hand pulls it back. Therefore, the EMH can be considered to 
be a special case of the AMH. This finding concurs with that of Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) and the implications of the AMH that market efficiency (arbitrage opportunity 
or the performance of investment strategies) varies over time. 
Second, we observe that the U.S. stock market is more informationally 
efficient, suggesting that both the pricing information in the IIF and the power of the 
mechanism reflect the level of market efficiency in an imperfect market setting. In 
this spirit, this finding is consistent with the widely held belief that emerging markets 
are less efficient than developed markets. 
Third, we construct factor models, which are more suitable for less efficient 
stock markets, by introducing the IIF to capture the shifts between the positive and 
negative IIF–return relations and better price portfolios in a less efficient market. 
Finally, we check the robustness of our findings using various subsample 
analyses, altering the ways of sorting the portfolios, and regressing on different factor 
models. Our findings strongly support the AMH and suggest a potential opportunity 
to build a trading strategy by equally investing in the stock quantiles sorted on the IIF. 
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Note: This figure shows the P-values of the one-sample t-tests on the U.S. and Chinese IIFs in 
the moving subsamples with a length of 1000, 300, 100, and 50 days. The horizontal axis 
denotes the dates when the subsamples begin. The vertical axis denotes the P-values that are 
the probability that the IIF has a mean of zero in a subsample under the zero-mean hypothesis. 
The horizontal line with a P-value of 0.1 shows the 10% significance level, below which the 








Note: This figure shows the P-values of the one-sample t-tests on the U.S. and Chinese SMB in the 
moving subsamples with a length of 1000, 300, 100, and 50 days. The horizontal axis denotes the 
dates when the subsamples begin. The vertical axis denotes the P-values that are the probability that 
SMB has a mean of zero in a subsample under the zero-mean hypothesis. The horizontal line with a P-










Note: This figure reports the percentages of the subsamples of a fixed length of 1500, 1000, 500, 300, 
100, 90, 80, 70, 60, 50, and 40 days in which the orthogonalized IIF using FF5F is significantly 
different from zero. To save space, similar results when using FF3F and WML4F to orthogonalize the 





Figure 4: Negative feedback mechanisms over time 
 
Note: This figure shows the patterns of the coefficients of the IIF from the time-series regressions on 
the portfolios formed by AE and size using factor model IIF6F in the moving subsamples of a fixed 
length of 1000 days. The seven colors in the legend represent the seven kinds of coefficients 
(significantly positive or negative at the three significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% and 
insignificant coefficients at the 10% significance level) in the negative feedback mechanism. The blue 
(red) bars denote positive (negative) coefficients. The vertical axis shows the portfolios. For example, 
S1E1 is the portfolio with the smallest size and lowest AE in a subsample. The horizontal axis denotes 
the dates when the subsamples start.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 















         
US Market         
MP 0.0002 0.0127 -0.0432 -0.0196 -0.0055 0.0006 0.0062 0.0183 
SMB 0.0013 0.0155 0.0880 -0.0235 -0.0066 0.0017 0.0095 0.0243 
HML 0.0000 0.0073 0.3206 -0.0112 -0.0036 0.0000 0.0036 0.0114 
WML 0.0000 0.0100 -0.0177 -0.0138 -0.0046 -0.0003 0.0043 0.0148 
IIF -0.0003 0.0059 -0.2753 -0.0095 -0.0032 -0.0002 0.0027 0.0086 
RMW 0.0005 0.0121 0.2708 -0.0180 -0.0059 0.0005 0.0069 0.0191 
CMA 0.0002 0.0075 -0.5072 -0.0101 -0.0033 0.0000 0.0035 0.0117 
         
CN Market         
MP 0.0005 0.0178 -0.3132 -0.0278 -0.0076 0.0010 0.0022 0.0267 
SMB 0.0004 0.0067 -0.6232 -0.0105 -0.0028 0.0007 0.0013 0.0102 
HML 0.0000 0.0062 0.2443 -0.0098 -0.0035 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0101 
WML 0.0002 0.0050 3.9984 -0.0066 -0.0022 0.0000 0.0003 0.0068 
IIF 0.0000 0.0045 -0.2761 -0.0073 -0.0021 0.0001 0.0005 0.0069 
RMW 0.0001 0.0049 0.5165 -0.0074 -0.0027 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0083 
CMA -0.0001 0.0034 -0.0485 -0.0057 -0.0020 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0053 
 
Panel B: Correlations between the variables 
        
  MP SMB HML WML IIF RMW CMA 
        
US Market        
MP 1.000  
     
SMB 0.177 1.000  
    
HML 0.058 0.093 1.000  
   
WML -0.171 -0.195 -0.376 1.000  
  
IIF 0.259 0.232 -0.039 -0.099 1.000  
 
RMW 0.201 0.316 0.400 -0.300 -0.058 1.000  
CMA -0.180 -0.223 -0.461 0.361 -0.126 -0.209 1.000 
        
CN Market        
MP 1.000 
     
 
SMB 0.140 1.000 
    
 
HML 0.199 -0.213 1.000 
   
 
WML -0.033 0.034 0.019 1.000 
  
 
IIF 0.064 0.241 -0.150 0.066 1.000 
 
 
RMW -0.234 -0.396 -0.305 0.055 -0.119 1.000  






Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the model variables. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics, and Panel B displays the correlations between the variables. The daily time-series statistics are 
reported for the factors. MP is the value-weighted daily market excess return; SMB is the daily return, 
which is the difference in the returns of portfolios between small stocks and large stocks; HML is the 
daily return, which is the difference in the returns of portfolios between high BM stocks and low BM 
stocks; WML is the daily return, which is the difference in the returns of portfolios between past 
winners and past losers; RMW is the daily return, which is the difference in the returns of portfolios 
between stocks with robust profitability and stocks with weak profitability; and CMA is the daily return, 
which is the difference in the returns of portfolios between stocks of low investment firms and stocks of 
high investment firms. The construction of these factors follows those of Fama and French (1992, 2012, 
2015). The IIF is the daily return, which is the difference in the returns of portfolios between stocks of 




Table 2: Number of significant factor coefficients in the factor models 
 
Panel A: 25 portfolios by the five size-quintile and five AE-quintile portfolios 
PANEL A 
  CAPM   FF3F   IIF3F   IIF4F   WML4F   IIF5F   FF5F   IIF6F 
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Panel B: 25 portfolios by the five BM-quintile and five AE-quintile portfolios 
PANEL B 
  CAPM   FF3F   IIF3F   IIF4F   WML4F   IIF5F   FF5F   IIF6F 
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Panel C: 25 AE-quintile portfolios 
PANEL C 
  CAPM   FF3F   IIF3F   IIF4F   WML4F   IIF5F   FF5F   IIF6F 
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Note: This table shows the numbers of significant factor coefficients in the U.S. and Chinese stock 
markets from the factor models at the 5% significance level. The US and CN columns show the 
results for the U.S. and Chinese stock markets, respectively. The eight models are the CAPM (Eq. 
(2)), FF3F (Eq. (3)), IIF3F (Eq. (4)), WML4F (Eq. (5)), FF5F (Eq. (6)), IIF4F (Eq. (7)), IIF5F (Eq. 
(8)), and IIF6F (Eq. (9)). At the end of July in each year, all stocks are sorted according to their 
market capitalization (size), the book-to-market ratio of equity (BM), and AE. Firms are then assigned 
to quintiles independently by size and AE, BM and AE, or AE only. Then, 25 portfolios are 
constructed at the intersection of the five size-quintile and five AE-quintile portfolios (Panel A), five 
BM-quintile and five AE-quintile portfolios (Panel B), or 25 AE-quintile portfolios only (Panel C). 




Table 3: Coefficients of the IIF in the regressions with IIF3F, IIF4F, IIF5F, and 
IIF6F 
 
Panel A: Coefficients of the IIF in the AE-size quintiles 
  
 AE Quintiles 
  


















Small 0.097 * 0.060  -0.212 *** -0.347 *** -0.324 *** 
 (1.57)  (1.10)  (-4.30)  (-5.58)  (-5.87)  
 0.281 *** 0.091 * -0.116 ** -0.229 *** -0.555 *** 
 (4.94)  (1.46)  (-1.78)  (-5.55)  (-11.39)  
 0.245 *** 0.020  0.035  -0.164 *** -0.367 *** 
 (5.93)  (0.43)  (0.78)  (-2.97)  (-9.58)  
 -0.020  0.020  -0.002  -0.271 *** -0.231 *** 
 (-0.46)  (0.63)  (-0.06)  (-6.20)  (-6.66)  
 0.548 *** 0.085 ** 0.059  -0.042  -0.776 *** 
Large (9.33)  (1.86)  (0.78)  (-0.84)  (-7.85)  


















Small 0.097 * 0.060  -0.212 *** -0.347 *** -0.324 *** 
 (1.57)  (1.09)  (-4.41)  (-6.18)  (-6.05)  
 0.281 *** 0.091 ** -0.116 ** -0.229 *** -0.555 *** 
 (5.90)  (1.96)  (-2.05)  (-6.55)  (-12.66)  
 0.245 *** 0.020  0.035  -0.164 *** -0.367 *** 
 (8.46)  (0.57)  (0.96)  (-3.95)  (-9.74)  
 -0.020  0.020  -0.002  -0.271 *** -0.231 *** 
 (-0.55)  (0.73)  (-0.07)  (-6.41)  (-6.61)  
 0.548 *** 0.085 *** 0.059  -0.042  -0.776 *** 
Large (13.71)  (2.51)  (1.17)  (-0.83)  (-8.29)  


















Small 0.312 *** 0.216 *** 0.152 *** -0.049  -0.135 *** 
 (7.42)  (6.04)  (3.27)  (-1.21)  (-3.36)  
 0.386 *** 0.227 *** 0.052 * -0.153 *** -0.316 *** 
 (8.82)  (6.02)  (1.46)  (-3.34)  (-7.47)  
 0.345 *** 0.208 *** 0.115 *** -0.041  -0.184 *** 
 (10.04)  (5.16)  (2.46)  (-1.14)  (-4.38)  
 0.295 *** 0.240 *** 0.123 *** 0.017  -0.150 *** 
 (6.23)  (4.66)  (2.78)  (0.40)  (-3.77)  
 0.763 *** 0.240 *** 0.195 *** -0.604 *** -0.598 *** 
Large (14.18)  (3.31)  (4.56)  (-6.05)  (-9.27)  


















Small 0.299 *** 0.206 *** 0.141 *** -0.058 * -0.144 *** 
 (8.11)  (6.56)  (3.25)  (-1.57)  (-3.75)  
 0.385 *** 0.228 *** 0.047 * -0.159 *** -0.322 *** 
 (9.25)  (6.65)  (1.45)  (-3.51)  (-8.12)  
 0.341 *** 0.206 *** 0.111 *** -0.041  -0.189 *** 
 (11.08)  (5.65)  (2.54)  (-1.25)  (-4.57)  
 0.297 *** 0.242 *** 0.121 *** 0.017  -0.148 *** 
 (7.01)  (5.00)  (2.97)  (0.42)  (-3.89)  
 0.770 *** 0.247 *** 0.194 *** -0.613 *** -0.585 *** 






Panel B: Coefficients of the IIF in the AE-BM quintiles 
  
 AE Quintiles 
  

















Low 0.650 *** 0.185 ** -0.032  -0.139 *** -0.404 *** 
 (8.76)  (2.07)  (-0.31)  (-2.51)  (-4.80)  
 0.347 *** -0.019  0.156 *** -0.279 *** -0.725 *** 
 (6.87)  (-0.49)  (2.59)  (-5.61)  (-5.81)  
 0.232 *** 0.083 ** 0.069 ** -0.128 *** -0.525 *** 
 (5.21)  (1.85)  (1.79)  (-2.97)  (-9.43)  
 0.287 *** 0.074  -0.016  -0.257 *** -0.202 *** 
 (4.08)  (1.24)  (-0.34)  (-4.68)  (-3.64)  
 0.568 *** 0.138 * -0.040  -0.117 ** -0.448 *** 
High (5.08)  (1.64)  (-0.65)  (-1.77)  (-8.18)  

















Low 0.640 *** 0.167 *** -0.081 * -0.160 *** -0.434 *** 
 (11.64)  (2.88)  (-1.28)  (-3.20)  (-6.93)  
 0.332 *** -0.010  0.155 *** -0.288 *** -0.733 *** 
 (7.18)  (-0.26)  (2.51)  (-6.25)  (-6.13)  
 0.232 *** 0.085 ** 0.074 ** -0.115 *** -0.517 *** 
 (5.45)  (1.84)  (2.04)  (-3.46)  (-9.30)  
 0.296 *** 0.090 ** -0.005  -0.259 *** -0.192 *** 
 (4.76)  (1.95)  (-0.17)  (-4.67)  (-4.60)  
 0.516 *** 0.162 *** -0.027  -0.094 ** -0.435 *** 
High (5.54)  (2.74)  (-0.60)  (-1.97)  (-9.79)  

















Low 0.449 *** 0.278 *** 0.152 ** -0.013  -0.251 *** 
 (8.04)  (4.14)  (2.17)  (-0.20)  (-3.93)  
 0.478 *** 0.213 *** 0.119 ** -0.034  -0.329 *** 
 (8.05)  (4.05)  (2.11)  (-0.65)  (-6.61)  
 0.626 *** 0.156 ** 0.094 ** -0.571 *** -0.389 *** 
 10  (2.10)  (1.90)  (-4.30)  (-5.96)  
 0.759 *** 0.376 *** 0.235 *** -0.067  -0.243 *** 
 (8.99)  (7.18)  (5.02)  (-1.17)  (-4.33)  
 0.308 *** 0.246 *** 0.191 *** -0.219 *** -0.316 *** 
High (7.23)  (4.78)  (3.69)  (-4.23)  (-5.64)  

















Low 0.448 *** 0.276 *** 0.147 *** -0.015  -0.253 *** 
 (12.01)  (5.64)  (2.93)  (-0.29)  (-5.00)  
 0.483 *** 0.215 *** 0.113 *** -0.031  -0.332 *** 
 (9.81)  (5.03)  (2.44)  (-0.71)  (-7.08)  
 0.608 *** 0.164 *** 0.093 ** -0.579 *** -0.389 *** 
 (11.01)  (2.41)  (1.90)  (-4.40)  (-6.17)  
 0.758 *** 0.377 *** 0.224 *** -0.065  -0.235 *** 
 (8.61)  (7.20)  (4.96)  (-1.10)  (-4.13)  
 0.308 *** 0.248 *** 0.183 *** -0.233 *** -0.307 *** 






Panel C: Coefficients of the IIF in the AE quintiles 
  IIF3F_US 









Low 0.433 *** 0.433 *** 0.511 *** 0.509 *** 
 (8.60)  (8.63)  (9.57)  (11.62)  
 0.081 ** 0.081 ** 0.404 *** 0.399 *** 
 (2.24)  (2.22)  (9.24)  (9.43)  
 0.244 *** 0.244 *** 0.515 *** 0.514 *** 
 (3.20)  (3.75)  (9.54)  (10.33)  
 -0.005  -0.005  0.543 *** 0.537 *** 
 (-0.06)  (-0.07)  (10.78)  (11.17)  
 -0.162 *** -0.162 *** 0.756 *** 0.755 *** 
 (-2.81)  (-3.09)  (8.83)  (8.82)  
 -0.088 ** -0.088 ** 0.479 *** 0.486 *** 
 (-1.89)  (-1.89)  (10.06)  (10.08)  
 0.041  0.041  0.306 *** 0.299 *** 
 (0.70)  (0.77)  (5.57)  (6.18)  
 -0.095 *** -0.095 *** 0.391 *** 0.388 *** 
 (-2.54)  (-2.56)  (6.62)  (7.30)  
 -0.057  -0.057  0.093 ** 0.099 ** 
 (-1.12)  (-1.13)  (2.11)  (2.25)  
 -0.085 * -0.085 * 0.052  0.064  
 (-1.33)  (-1.63)  (0.64)  (0.85)  
 -0.297 *** -0.297 *** 0.199 *** 0.189 *** 
 (-5.16)  (-6.13)  (4.29)  (4.44)  
 0.893 *** 0.893 *** 0.156 *** 0.157 *** 
 (10.19)  (14.42)  (2.87)  (3.09)  
 -0.404 *** -0.404 *** 0.210 *** 0.195 *** 
 (-7.27)  (-7.70)  (3.70)  (3.61)  
 -0.685 *** -0.685 *** 0.116 *** 0.117 *** 
 (-5.23)  (-5.27)  (2.42)  (2.57)  
 -0.239 *** -0.239 *** 0.052  0.055  
 (-4.74)  (-4.58)  (0.94)  (1.04)  
 -0.398 *** -0.398 *** 0.123 *** 0.115 *** 
 (-5.29)  (-5.22)  (2.39)  (2.38)  
 -0.584 *** -0.584 *** 0.076 * 0.082 * 
 (-9.65)  (-9.90)  (1.36)  (1.52)  
 -0.591 *** -0.591 *** -0.012  -0.012  
 (-6.93)  (-8.18)  (-0.25)  (-0.24)  
 0.335 *** 0.335 *** -0.917 *** -0.932 *** 
 (4.98)  (6.60)  (-8.89)  (-9.01)  
 0.315 *** 0.315 *** -0.418 *** -0.420 *** 
 (8.35)  (8.36)  (-7.11)  (-6.92)  
 0.228 *** 0.228 *** -0.349 *** -0.343 *** 
 (3.49)  (4.32)  (-4.87)  (-4.79)  
 0.063  0.063  -0.259 *** -0.253 *** 
 (1.01)  (1.04)  (-6.08)  (-6.04)  
 0.343 *** 0.343 *** -0.276 *** -0.272 *** 
 (5.47)  (7.09)  (-5.49)  (-5.46)  
 -0.053 * -0.053 * -0.339 *** -0.342 *** 
 (-1.44)  (-1.37)  (-6.25)  (-6.22)  
 -0.254 *** -0.254 *** -0.584 *** -0.578 *** 
High (-2.79)  (-2.95)  (-8.40)  (-8.51)  
Note: This table reports the coefficients of the IIFs in the time-series regressions with the factor 
models, including IIF3F, IIF4F, IIF5F, and IIF6F. At the end of July in each year, stocks are ranked 
into five size quintiles and five AE quintiles independently. The intersections of the two types 
produce 25 AE-size portfolios (Panel A). Similarly, 25 AE-BM portfolios (Panel B) are produced, 
while 25 AE portfolios (Panel C) are produced by ranking stocks. The IIF is the orthogonalized IIF. 
The t statistics are in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote the significance of the factor loading at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The positive and significant coefficients are dark-shaded, 




Table 4: GRS test results 
 




GRS-P AAVI Aver_r2  
GRS-
stat 
GRS-P AAVI Aver_r2 
          
Panel A: 25 AE-size portfolios 
CAPM 12.44 0.00 12.23 0.63  1.71 0.02 3.07 0.79 
FF3F 5.82 0.00 3.83 0.72  1.34 0.12 1.14 0.87 
IIF3F 5.52 0.00 3.76 0.73  1.29 0.15 1.11 0.87 
WML4F 5.76 0.00 3.82 0.73  1.37 0.10 1.13 0.87 
IIF4F 5.46 0.00 3.76 0.73  1.34 0.12 1.14 0.87 
FF5F 6.22 0.00 4.09 0.73  1.39 0.09 1.13 0.87 
IIF5F 5.43 0.00 3.75 0.73  1.38 0.10 1.13 0.87 
IIF6F 5.86 0.00 4.10 0.74  1.41 0.09 1.13 0.88 
          
Panel B: 25 AE-BM portfolios 
CAPM 5.86 0.00 6.65 0.64  0.77 0.78 1.48 0.78 
FF3F 1.79 0.01 1.92 0.71  0.68 0.89 0.89 0.81 
IIF3F 2.21 0.00 2.28 0.69  0.68 0.89 0.92 0.80 
WML4F 1.72 0.01 1.80 0.71  0.70 0.86 0.88 0.81 
IIF4F 2.22 0.00 2.08 0.72  0.68 0.88 0.89 0.82 
FF5F 1.23 0.20 1.34 0.71  0.71 0.85 0.87 0.81 
IIF5F 2.18 0.00 1.97 0.72  0.70 0.87 0.88 0.82 
IIF6F 1.70 0.02 1.54 0.72  0.71 0.85 0.87 0.82 
          
Panel C: 25 AE portfolios 
CAPM 4.74 0.00 6.47 0.64  1.35 0.12 1.64 0.80 
FF3F 0.87 0.64 1.29 0.68  1.27 0.17 1.17 0.81 
IIF3F 0.81 0.74 1.47 0.69  1.39 0.09 1.15 0.81 
WML4F 0.80 0.74 1.17 0.69  1.36 0.11 1.19 0.81 
IIF4F 0.74 0.82 1.27 0.69  1.40 0.09 1.17 0.81 
FF5F 0.52 0.98 0.83 0.69  1.19 0.24 1.13 0.81 
IIF5F 0.70 0.87 1.15 0.70  1.45 0.07 1.20 0.82 
IIF6F 0.46 0.99 0.81 0.70   1.29 0.15 1.12 0.82 
 
Note: This table reports the model evaluation results. At the end of July in each year, stocks are 
ranked into five size quintiles and five AE quintiles independently. The intersections of the two 
types produce 25 AE-size portfolios (Panel A). Similarly, 25 AE-BM portfolios (Panel B) are 
produced, while 25 AE portfolios (Panel C) are produced by ranking stocks. GRS-stat shows the 
value of the GRS statistics. GRS-p shows the corresponding P-value of the GRS statistics. 
AAVI denotes the average absolute value of the intercepts. Aver_r2 provides the average 
adjusted R square. 




Appendix: Calculating AE 
We denote an 1N  time series of the stock return data as (1), (2),..., ( )r r r N . 
Step 1: Form a positive integer, m, and a positive real number,  . m denotes the 
length of the compared run of data and r specifies the filtering level. 
Step 2: Form a sequence of vectors, (1), (2),..., ( 1)x x x N m− + . ( )x i is a vector of 
1m , which is defined by ( ) [ ( ), ( 1),..., ( 1)]x i r i r i r i m= + + − . 
Step 3: Select ( )x i  and ( )x j from the sequence (1), (2),..., ( 1)x x x N m− + . ( )x i
and ( )x j  are considered to be similar if their distance is smaller than a given tolerance, 
 . The distance is defined as 
* *( , ) max ( ) ( )
a
d x x r a r a= − . 










, where n is the number of ( )x j , which is similar to ( )x i . 













 = − +  . 
Step 6: Define AE as 
1( ) ( )m mAE  +=  − . 
Typically, in applications, the parameters are specified by 2m = and 0.15 = , 







                                                 
i According to Lo (2004, 2005), the AMH implies that in an ever-changing market, (1) the 
relationship is unstable over time, (2) arbitrage opportunities arise occasionally, (3) the 
performance of investment strategies varies over time, and (4) innovation is the key factor 
to survival. 
ii We calculate the market excess returns by both value-weighted and equally weighted ways, 
which does not affect our conclusions. To save space, we report only the value-weighted 
results. 
iii We also obtain robust results when deleting stocks that have more than 40, 60, 70, or 80 
trading days of missing returns in the rolling windows of 500 consecutive trading days. 
The results are available on request. 
iv We mainly focused on statistical significance in our paper. In addition, we also find that the 
IIF is of economical significance in terms of coefficient magnitude by benchmarking 
against HML, RMW, and CMA in Fama and French (2015). However, economical 
significance also relates to transaction cost, tax, risk, etc. In view of this, a comprehensive 
analysis of the economical significance of IIF will probably be explored in our future 
research. 
